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Abstract In The Price Is Right game show, players compete to
win a prize, by placing bids on its price. We ask whether it is
possible to achieve a “wisdom of the crowd” effect, by
combining the bids to produce an aggregate price estimate that
is superior to the estimates of individual players. Using data
from the game show,we show that a wisdom of the crowd effect
is possible, especially by using models of the decision-making
processes involved in bidding. The key insight is that, because
of the competitive nature of the game, what people bid is not
necessarily the same as what they know. This means better
estimates are formed by aggregating latent knowledge than by
aggregating observed bids. We use our results to highlight the
usefulness of models of cognition and decision-making in
studying the wisdom of the crowd, which are often approached
only from non-psychological statistical perspectives.
Keywords Wisdom of the crowd.Group decision
making.Optimal decision making.Bayesian inference
The Price Is Right is a well-known game show involving a
number of different competitions. The most frequent
competition is caricatured in Fig. 1 and involves four
players placing bids to win a prize. Bids are placed
sequentially—from Player 1 to Player 4—with all players
knowing the value of preceding bids. Once all bids have
been made, the winner is the player whose bid is closest to,
without exceeding, the true value of the prize. In Fig. 1, the
winner is Player 2 because, although Player 3’s bid of
$1,100 is closer to the true price of $960, it goes over the
true price.
This competition provides an interesting “real-world”
source of competitive decision-making data and has
occasionally been used to study human decision-making
(e.g., Bennett & Hickman, 1993; Berk, Hughson, &
Vandezande, 1996). Those previous studies come from
behavioral economics and are largely concerned with
assessing the rationality of people’s bids.
Our research question is different: We are interested in
whether it is possible to combine the knowledge of the four
players to provide a good estimate of the true value of the
prize. Each player is likely to have some knowledge that
helps estimate a price, but it is unlikely that any player
knows the exact answer. Under these circumstances, it
should be possible to combine the individual knowledge to
form a group answer that improves the estimate of the true
value of the prize. This idea is essentially a miniature form
of the “wisdom of the crowd” phenomenon, in which
estimates formed by aggregating individual answers are
superior to even those provided by the best individuals in
the group (Surowiecki, 2004).
The wisdom of crowds is an interesting psychological
phenomenon closely related to classic areas of psycholog-
ical inquiry, including group decision-making (e.g., Hastie
& Kameda, 2005; Kerr & Tindale, 2004), memory and
knowledge representation (e.g., Altmann, 2003; Norman,
Detre, & Polyn, 2008), and heuristics and biases in
estimation (e.g., Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Kahneman &
Tversky, 2000). It provides a fresh and interesting set of
theoretical questions and behavioral tasks linking these
sometimes disparate areas of psychology, and so has
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1 Wisdom-of-the-
crowd research within psychology has considered issues
such as whether it is possible to combine multiple estimates
from a single person to generate better decisions (e.g.,
Herzog & Hertwig, 2009; Vul & Pashler, 2008) or how to
combine decisions, like rank orders or sequences of
decisions, that are more complicated than a single numer-
ical estimate (e.g., Steyvers, Lee, Miller, & Hemmer, 2009;
Zhang & Lee, 2010).
The wisdom-of-the-crowd issue we address is whether
combining the knowledge of Price Is Right contestants can
be done most effectively by using a model of their decision-
making processes. Because of the competitive nature of the
task, what people say when they bid is different from what
they believe the price to be. A good example is provided by
the sequence of bids in Fig. 1, which comes directly from a
real competition from the show. The fourth player does not
bid $1 because they believe that is the value of the stereo.
Rather, their bid reflects a clever strategy designed to
improve their chance of winning: If Player 4 believes that
the three previous bids are all likely to exceed the true
price, the rules of the competition mean that the best final
bid is $1.
The net effect of strategies like this is that aggregating
bids by, for example, finding their average is not necessar-
ily the best way to combine the knowledge of the contest-
ants. Rather, the goal should be to combine the knowledge
about prices that led to the observed bids. For the most
useful aggregation of information across people, we have to
average what they know, not what they say. This requires
the ability to infer price knowledge from bid behavior,
which, in turn, requires a model of the strategy or decision-
making process that converted each player’s price beliefs
into bids. In this sense, the applied question of aggregating
bids to form accurate group estimates provides both a
challenge for cognitive modeling and an opportunity to test
theoretical and modeling ideas on real-world data.
In this article, we explore a set of methods for
aggregating bids in the Price Is Right competition. These
methods include simple heuristic and statistical methods
using the bids themselves and more complicated methods
based on decision-making models. We evaluate the ability
of all of the approaches to estimate the true value of prizes,
using a data set from the real game show, and find that the
use of decision models can substantially improve aggregate
estimation. We then discuss what our results mean both
theoretically and practically, considering the role of
decision-making models in studying group decision-
making, and discuss the advantages of using competitions
to extract and combine people’s knowledge.
Data
Our data are sequences of bids and true prize prices
collected from 72 competitions from the U.S. version of
The Price Is Right game show, screened between March
and June 2009. A few competitions that included extreme
outlier bids (greater than $5,000) were removed, as were
those competitions in which every player bid above the true
price. In the latter situation, within the game show, the
competition is repeated with the same prize and same
contestants, and we used the second version for our data.
Aggregation methods
We considered a total of 11 different aggregation methods
as ways of using the players’ bids to form a group estimate.
Seven of these methods are simple, based directly on the
bids themselves. The remaining 4 come from decision-
making models. Together, these aggregation methods let us
begin to explore the importance of cognitive modeling in
achieving the wisdom-of-the-crowd effect.
The 11 methods are summarized in Table 1, where a
concrete example of their application is also shown. In
particular, we detail how they combine the bids shown in
Fig. 1—$650, $675, $1,100, and $1—to produce an
aggregate estimate. We also measure how that estimate
fares in relation to the true price of $960, in terms of both
the absolute error between the estimate and the truth and
the relative error (i.e., the absolute error normalized by the
true price).
1 However, inevitably, it is possible to trace back relevant work
throughout the history of cognitive psychology. Stroop’s( 1932)
comparison of group and average group-member accuracy in judging
weights is a good early example and reviews an even earlier literature.
Fig. 1 A Price Is Right competition, with four players placing bids to
win a stereo. Player 2 is the winner, because their bid of $675 is the
closest to the true price of $960, without having exceeding the true
price
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There are many obvious and simple ways to use the bids
provided by contestants to estimate the price of prizes. One
approach is just to take a bid directly as an estimate. This
can be done separately for each of the players. It can also be
done by picking a player at random, as a way of getting
average performance at the level of individual bids.
Another obvious approach based on the bids is to take
their arithmetic average, and the final simple approach we
considered was to take the average of the middlemost two
bids. That is, we removed the highest and lowest bids (as in
some sports scoring systems) and averaged the remaining
two, as a way of dealing with outlier bids like $1. Of
course, it is easy to think of other simple methods based on
the bids, but these seemed sufficient to provide a baseline
level of accuracy.
Decision-model methods for aggregating
The four methods for aggregation we consider based on
decision models make the same basic representational and
decision-making assumptions. We now describe those
assumptions and the four specific models we developed, and
outline the inference process that let us apply the models to a
set of bids to produce an aggregate price estimate. The
Discussion section considers limitations and extensions of
the basic assumptions, and the Appendix gives formal details
of the decision models and inference process.
Two modeling assumptions Our interest is whether using
models of decision-making can lead to improved estimates of
the true values of the prizes. To build decision models, we relied
on two key assumptions. The first is that, following the basic
motivation for the wisdom-of-the-crowd effect, people have
shared but inexact knowledge about the prices of the prizes. To
make this idea concrete, we assume that uncertain knowledge of
prices can be represented by simple ranges, defined by upper
and lower values that bound the true price. While this is not the
only possible assumption, it is a reasonable one. People often
seemtothinkofuncertaintyinpricesintermsofboundedranges
(e.g., “What is the maximum you are willing to pay?”). The
bounds could be very precise, such as believing a stereo’sp r i c e
is between $950 and $1,000, or they could be very broad,
putting the price between $500 and $1,500. We also allow for
the possibility that people’s knowledge may be quite wrong,
perhapsputtingthepricebetween$200and$500.Theimportant
aspects of the assumption are that the uncertain knowledge is in
some sense shared, because there is a single true price
underlying the inexact knowledge people have, and that this
knowledge can be quantified by upper and lower bounds.
Our second assumption is that players make decisions in one
of two ways. Perhaps they bid nonstrategically, and simply
choose a number between their lower and upper bounds as their
Table 1 The performance of the 11 methods, in terms of absolute error and relative error, on a competition with bids of $650, $675, $1,100, and
$1 and a true price of $960
Method Description Estimate Abs Error Rel Error
First bid Use the first bid as the estimate 650 310 0.32
Second bid Use the second bid as the estimate 675 285 0.30
Third bid Use the third bid as the estimate 1,100 140 0.15
Fourth bid Use the fourth bid as the estimate 1 959 1.0
Random bid Use one of the bids at random {650, 675,
1,100, 1}
{310, 285,
140, 959}
{0.32, 0.30,
0.15, 1.0}
Average bid Use the average of the four bids as the estimate 607 353 0.37
Middle two Use the average of the middlemost bids 663 297 0.31
Nonstrategic Assume that players choose between bounds nonstrategically,
and use the inferred mean between the bounds as the
estimate
551 409 0.43
Nonstrategic with
individual differences
Assume that players choose between different bounds
centered
on the same mean nonstrategically, and use the common
mean as the estimate
674 286 0.30
Last player optimal Assume first that three players choose between bounds
nonstrategically but the last one bids according to
probability of winning, and use the inferred mean
between the bounds as the estimate
818 142 0.15
Last two players optimal Assume that first two players choose between bounds
nonstrategically but the last two bid according to
their probability of winning, and use the inferred mean
between the bounds as the estimate
900 60 0.06
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players bid strategically, according to the probability that a bid
will result in them winning the competition. A look at our raw
data gives reason to believe that this might sometimes be the
case. For example, in 79 of the 272 competitions (about 30%),
the final bid was $1 greater than the bid made by one of the
previous players. This is consistent with an optimal strategy for
the last player.
Of course, we do not believe that everybody who plays The
Price Is Right bids optimally, nor do we believe that people are
even capable, in most cases, of working out what corresponds
to an optimal bid through any explicit process. But we do
believe, especially for the third and fourth players in the
sequence, that at least part of their bidding decisions can be
understood as driven by strategies or heuristics to help them
win. This position that rationality provides a framework for
understanding decision-making is consistent with many previ-
ous analyses of The Price Is Right and other game shows (e.g.,
Gertner, 1993; Metrick, 1995). It is also consistent with recent
influential work in cognitive science that has aimed for a
rational or “computational-level” explanation of human
cognition (e.g., Chater, Tenenbaum, & Yuille, 2006; Griffiths,
Kemp, & Tenenbaum, 2008).
Four decision models Based on these representational and
decision-making assumptions, we considered four aggrega-
tion models. The first uses the simplest possible account of
decision-making, which is that all four players bid non-
strategically, and so choose a random bid between the lower
and upper bounds. In this account, the bounds are the same
for all players.
The second model also assumes that players choose
nonstrategically from their range, but it allows each player
to have a different range. This approach allows for
individual differences in the accuracy of players’ knowl-
edge and assumes instead that the shared information about
the true price means that each range is centered on that true
price. This model is a natural adaptation of the Thurstonian
model for the wisdom-of-the-crowd analysis presented by
Steyvers et al. (2009).
The third and fourth models are quite different, because
they allow for strategic bidding by some players. The third
model assumes that Players 1–3 continue to choose
nonstrategically between their bounds but that Player 4
chooses strategically. We adopt a probability-matching
definition of what it means to be rational (see Vulkan,
2000). This means that Player 4 chooses a particular bid in
proportion to the probability of that bid winning, based on
their knowledge about the upper and lower bounds and
their knowledge of the first three bids. This sort of
assumption has limitations that we address in the Dis-
cussion, but it is used in some cognitive models of
decision-making (e.g., Busemeyer & Stout, 2002; Griffiths
& Tenenbaum, 2009; Lee & Sarnecka, 2010; Nosofsky,
1984) and is consistent with theories of decision-making by
sampling (e.g., Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006; Vul,
Goodman, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, 2009).
An example of strategic bidding for the fourth player in
shown in the left panel of Fig. 2. The previous bids of
$650, $675, and $1,100 are shown by circles. Also shown
by the dashed bounded line beneath is an example of the
price knowledge that the fourth player might have. In this
example, the fourth player believes the prize costs between
$500 and $1,250. The solid line above the bids then shows
the probability that the fourth player will win for any
possible bid made. This probability peaks at bids of $1 and
of $1 above any of the existing bids and measures the
proportion of the hypothesized true price range that falls
above the bid of the fourth player and below the next
highest bid. In the example in Fig. 2, the best bid the fourth
player can make is $676, since it is most likely that the true
price lies between $675 and $1,100, when compared to the
possibilities of less than $650, between $650 and $675, and
greater than $1,100.
Our fourth and final model assumes that only the first
two players choose nonstrategically and that the third and
fourth bid strategically. As before, the fourth player
makes a bid that maximizes their probability of winning,
given all of the earlier bids. But now, the third player
also bids according to their probability of winning,
assuming that the fourth player is going to see their bid
and then also bid strategically. An example of strategic
bidding for the third player is shown in the right panel of
Fig. 2. Now, only the first two bids of $650 and $675 are
650 675 1100
500   1250
Player 4
650 675
300   700
Player 3 Fig. 2 Rational decision-making
for the fourth (left panel) and
third (right panel) players, given
the existing bids, shown by
circles, and bounded price
knowledge, shown by the
dashed-line interval
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knowledge, with bounds of $300 and $700. Under this
scenario, the third player believes the existing bids are
likely too high, but this player cannot simply bid $1,
because they know that the fourth player will then
immediately “cut them off” with a $2 bid. Instead, the
third player must judge how low their bid can go without
being “cut off.” The curve in Fig. 2 shows how this
balance is reflected in the probabilities of the third player
winning, and guides their strategic bidding.
Note that both of the analyses in Fig. 2 are based on the
specific price range that is assumed. For other beliefs about
price, what would constitute strategic behavior would be
different, because the probabilities of winning with various
bids would change. For example, the right panel of Fig. 2
makes it clear that if Player 3 in Fig. 1 is behaving
strategically by bidding $1,100, this player does not believe
the price range is anything like $300–$700. This link
between latent price knowledge and observed bidding is
what we exploited to do model-based inference about what
people know, based on what they bid.
Aggregation by inference All four decision models can be
used in the same basic way to form an aggregate price
estimate from the observed bids. The Appendix gives
formal details, but the intuitions are discussed here. The key
idea is to use each model to make an inference about the
upper and lower bounds, based on the bids. That is, we take
the assumptions made by the model about how people use
the bounds to generate bids, and then invert them. Rather
than starting with the bounds to generate the bids, we start
with the bids to infer the bounds. This can be done using
standard Bayesian statistical inference. In terms of condi-
tional probabilities, Bayes’s theorem provides the bridge to
go from the probability of bids given bounds, which is what
the decision models define, to the probability of bounds
given bids, which is what we want in order to form an
aggregate estimate.
It is helpful to summarize how inference proceeds for the
concreteexamplewehavebeenusingthroughout,withbidsof
$650, $675, $1,100, and $1. For the simplest decision model,
with nonstrategic bidding from a single range, the observed
bids force that range to extend from $1 to $1,100. That is, the
only way to explain the disparity in the bids is to infer that the
players have a very uncertain knowledge, spanning all the
way from the smallest to the largest bid. This leads to an
inferred estimate of the price, and mean of the inferred range,
of $551, as shown in Table 1.
The nonstrategic bidding with individual differences
model can explain the variety of bids by inferring
different ranges, but these ranges must center on the
inferred true price. For the concrete example, it turns out
that the inferred ranges center on $674 and extend from
$650 to $698, $673 to $675, $248 to $1,100, and $1 to
$1,348, respectively, for the four players. In this way, the
final bid of $1 is explained as coming from a player with
very poor knowledge of the true price. A natural property
of the individual differences model is that bids from
players with poor knowledge are “downweighted” in
forming the aggregate. From this perspective, the inferred
group value of $674 can be viewed as a weighted sum of
the individual bids, with weights reflecting the inferred
certainty of knowledge. It is also reasonable to view this
weighting process as a form of model-based outlier
detection, with extreme bids like $1 in the example
contributing very little to the final inference.
The two strategic decision models treat the extreme bids
as goal-driven competitive behavior. To understand the
inference process for these models, Fig. 3 summarizes the
process for the model in which the final two players bid
strategically. The contour plot shows the relative probability
of each possible combination of lower and upper bounds
producing these bids. The single most likely combination is
shown by the cross and corresponds to a price range from
$536 and $1,265. Given this inferred knowledge of range, it
is natural to take the halfway point as the aggregate
estimate of the true price, which is $900. The linear inset
in Fig. 3 summarizes this analysis, showing that the
decision model allows us to take the observed bids, infer
the underlying knowledge about the price range that most
likely generated those bids, and summarize that price range
as a group estimate.
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Fig. 3 Forming an aggregate estimate from bids, based on inference
using a decision-making model. The contour plot shows the
distribution over inferred lower and upper bounds for the price range
knowledge shared by players. The inset shows the actual bids
(circles), the most likely bounds ($536 and $1,265), and the center
of these price bounds ($900), which corresponds to the model-based
aggregate of the bids
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We applied all 11 aggregation methods to all of the
competitions in our data set. For each competition and
each method, we measured the mean error between the
aggregate estimate and the true price in the different ways
p r e s e n t e di nT a b l e1. The mean absolute difference
quantifies how many dollars away from the true price each
estimate was on average. The mean relative absolute
difference quantifies the proportion of the true price that
an estimate differs from the true price on average.
Our results are summarized in Fig. 4, which shows the
performance of all 11 methods on both measures simulta-
neously. Obviously, lower mean and relative mean absolute
deviations are better, so methods closer to the lower-left
corner give more accurate estimates of the true price of the
prize. Figure 4 thus reveals a clear ordering of the
performance for the methods, which is robust across both
measures.
The model-based approach in which the last two players
bid strategically provides the best performance; the second
best performance comes from assuming that only the bid of
the last player is strategic. The simple approaches of
averaging all bids or the middlemost two bids give
extremely similar performance, and they are followed by
the two model-based averaging methods (one allowing for
individual differences, one not) that do not incorporate
strategic bidding. All of the simple measures based on a
single bid perform much worse, although there is a clear
order for each player. The best individual bid comes from
the second player, followed by the third, the first, and the
last players.
Discussion
Present findings
There are really three factors underlying our 11 methods,
and they build on each other in a logical way. The first
factor is whether information is aggregated across players.
The second is, if there is aggregation, whether it is done
directly on the bids or on a decision-model-based inference
of a latent price estimate. The third is, if there is model-
based aggregation, whether people are assumed to follow a
simple nonstrategic decision process or to behave strategi-
cally according to their probability of winning.
In terms of these three factors, our results show that
aggregation improves performance. The best six methods
all involve aggregation, and the worst five do not. This
finding provides clear support for the wisdom-of-the-crowd
phenomenon applying to our small groups in a competitive
bidding task. The same basic conclusion was reached by
Lee and Shi (2010) from controlled laboratory data, and it
is interesting to see it confirmed with real-world game show
data.
The second finding is that decision-model approaches
can improve a simple aggregation of bids, but only if the
right assumptions about the decision processes and goals
are embedded within a model. The model-based averages
that rely on nonstrategic decision-making (with or without
individual differences) perform worse than the simple mean
of the bids (or of the middlemost two bids).
Only when we assume that one or more players are
bidding strategically do the decision models begin to
outperform simple aggregation.
Limitations and future directions
There are three ways in which the models we chose to
consider were constrained by issues of computational
feasibility. The most obvious is that we never allowed the
first or second players to choose strategically. The
computational effort that would be involved in considering
these models is prohibitive, because of the recursive nature
of the optimization problem facing early players in the
bidding sequence. We would like to find more efficient
computational methods to explore methods assuming fully
strategic bidding. We suspect that they would not improve
substantially on the best model we have implemented here,
because we think early players in the real Price Is Right
game struggle even to approximate strategic bidding. But
we might be wrong, and it would be interesting to find out.
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uncertainty about prices was also made partly on grounds of
computational convenience. From this assumption, we were
able to make some analytic derivations that helped make the
inference process tractable.
2 We think this is a reasonable
assumption, but we would like to explore alternative
representations of knowledge, such as normal distributions.
Finally, we needed the assumption of probability match-
ing in decision-making in order to make inference tractable.
In particular, we were not able to consider a model of
decision-making in which players bid to maximize the
probability of winning, even though this seems a compel-
ling psychological possibility. Deterministic rules like
choosing the unique maximum are not easily analyzed
within the probabilistic approach to inference we have
adopted. There are possible modeling solutions to this
problem, involving such statistical methods as entropifica-
tion (e.g., Grünwald, 1999; Lee, 2004) or an extended
exponentiated version of the decision rule (e.g., Kruschke,
1992; Lee & Vanpaemel, 2008), but they present significant
computational challenges.
Beyond these technical challenges, there are other
extensions, refinements, and improvements to our approach
that are also worth trying. Almost all of our basic
assumptions—that players have a common belief about
the price distribution, that beliefs center on the true price, or
that players choose their bids based entirely on either
strategic or nonstrategic bases—could be improved. We
would like to extend our ability to allow for more detailed
forms of individual differences in knowledge, especially in
the models using strategic bidding.
Applications and implications
While The Price Is Right game show is geared toward
entertainment, it does raise issues that are relevant for
important applied problems. The competitive nature of the
estimation task mirrors such real-world devices as auctions
(e.g., Krishna, 2002) and prediction markets (e.g.,
Christiansen, 2007) for estimating values and probabilities.
In such contexts, we think our results support the idea that
competition is an effective way to extract information from
people. Often expertise needs to be combined in situations
where there are only a few experts and their knowledge is
not independent. In the military, a few domain experts
might be asked to estimate how many missiles an enemy
country has, and their estimates will be based on shared
intelligence information. In business, estimating the prob-
ability a merger will be successful might be a task given to
a few key managers, and their advice will be based on
similar training and data. Under such circumstances, the
large-scale aggregation and independence assumptions for
standard wisdom-of-the-crowd effects do not apply. Our
case study suggests that competitions between the few
experts might be an effective way of combining their
knowledge.
Theoretically, we think our results give some credence to
the idea that finding the wisdom in crowds will often
require theories and models from the cognitive sciences.
Sometimes the wisdom-of-the-crowd effect is viewed as a
statistical one, involving the amplification of signal and
removal of noise by statistical methods. What this perspec-
tive misses is that the observed data in wisdom-of-the-
crowd studies are very often estimates, judgments, prefer-
ences, bids, opinions, or guesses made by people. This
means that the available data can be best understood
through the window of goal-directed human decision-
making. Indeed, most generally, we think the present study
highlights a general malaise in how cognitive psychology
treats its relationship to statistics, machine learning, and
other fields that adopt quantitative approaches to decision-
making and inference. Too often, we think, psychology
does not become involved in problems where its contribu-
tion could be critically useful.
A good example of this issue is provided by a recently
finished Netflix competition. Netflix is a company that
rents DVD movies to customers, who provide ratings of
the movies they watch. Using these data, Netflix uses a
statistical model to provide recommendations of other
movies a user is likely to rate highly. The Netflix
competition involved large cash prizes—including a grand
prize of one million dollars—for quantitative methods that
significantly improved recommendation accuracy, based
on a corpus of real rating data. We think that, in large part,
the Netflix competition asked a fundamentally psycholog-
ical question—how people rated richly structured aesthetic
stimuli—and offered a million-dollar reward for predictive
capabilities based on understanding this process. Yet, with
perhaps one notable exception (Potter, 2008), the entrants
to the competition were primarily trained in, and applied,
nonpsychological methods from statistics and machine
learning.
Against this context, we think the present study supports
a different perspective. Our ability here to apply cognitive
decision models and thereby achieve better aggregate price
estimates from competitive Price Is Right bids shows the
fundamental role of psychological models in complicated
applied statistical problems involving people. Most espe-
cially, we think that research into wisdom-of-the-crowd
phenomena should not just be a domain for the develop-
ment and application of innovative and useful statistical
methods, but also a motivating problem for the understand-
ing of human cognition and decision-making.
2 Details are available in an online note, at www.socsci.uci.edu/
~mdlee.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we formalize the decision-making models,
and how they are used to infer group estimates. The
decision models we used for inference make two key
classes of assumption. The first is a representational
assumption, which is that all of the players have partial
knowledge of the price of a prize and that their uncertainty
can be represented by the same upper and lower bounds u
and l. The second is a decision-making assumption, which
is that players either bid strategically, according to their
probability of winning the game, or nonstrategically,
choosing a number consistent with their knowledge but
independent of other bids. For each decision-making
model, our inferential goal is to find the mean of the upper
and lower bounds, since it represents the average price
based on the players’ knowledge.
Nonstrategic bidding
Both of the nonstrategic models are straightforward. If
the xth player believes that the true price lies between a
lower bound lx and an upper bound ux, then every choice
between those bounds is equally likely. Thus, the
probability that the xth player will bid y, for all possible
bids lx ≤ y ≤ ux,i s
px yjux;lx ðÞ ¼ 1= ux   lx þ 1 ðÞ :
For the first model, where each player has the same
knowledge, lx and ux are the same for all players. The
extension to individual differences in the second model
means that there is a common mean, μ, but a separate range
rx for the xth player, so that lx =m a x ( 1 ,μ − rx)a n dux =m i n
(5,000, μ + rx).
Optimal bidding
Modeling strategic bidding is more complicated. Our
approach is similar to that presented by Lee and Shi
(2010), but different in several important ways. The first
difference is that we assume that people’s knowledge of
prices is defined by upper and lower bounds, rather than by
normal distributions. A second difference is that we
consider mixtures of strategic and nonstrategic bidding,
rather than just strategic bidding. A final difference is that
our analyses extend to the 4 participants in a Price Is Right
game, rather than the 3 participants in the laboratory data
collected by Lee and Shi (2010).
Win functions Formally, given u and l, we can define a
“win” function wx(a, b, c, d, u, l) for the probability that the
xth player will win, given bids a, b, c,a n dd for Players 1,
2, 3, and 4, respectively. This win probability is just the
area under the uniform distribution between the bid of the
xth player and the next highest bid (or the maximum
possible bid, if it is the highest bid).
A concrete example is given in Fig. 5, using the bids 650,
675, 1,100, and 1 in the case where the true price distribution
is between 500 and 1,250. Under these circumstances, the
fourth player (bidding $1) will win if the true price turns out
to be below $650. Given the belief about where the true price
may fall, this means that w4 650; 675; 1100; 1; 1250; ð 500Þ
¼ 650   500 ðÞ = 1;250   500 ðÞ ¼ 20%. The probabilities
for the other bids are found similarly and are shown in
Fig. 5. Note that the win function captures the “closest
without going over” rule of the competition. Different rules,
such as simply being as close as possible to the true price or
being as close as possible without going under, could be
considered by changing the win function appropriately.
Decision-making On the basis of the win function, we can
formalize what constitutes strategic decision-making for
each player. Player 4 knows about the existing bids a, b,
and c, so the probability that this player will win if they
made the bid d is just
pd dja;b;c;u;l ðÞ ¼ w4 a;b;c;d;u;l ðÞ :
Thus, formalizing what it means to be a strategic player
in terms of probability matching, they will choose accord-
ing to these probabilities, so that
p4 da ;b;c;u;l j ðÞ ¼
p4 da ;b;c;u;l j ðÞ
P
d0p4 d0 a;b;c;u;l j ðÞ
:
The analysis is a little more complicated for Player 3.
They know only about the earlier bids a and b but can
assume that if they bid c, Player 4 will subsequently behave
650 675 1100 1
500   1250
   20%    3%    57%    20%
Fig. 5 The win function probabilities for bids of 1, 650, 675, and
1,100 when the price distribution is bounded between 500 and 1,250
Mem Cogn (2011) 39:914–923 921strategically and bid according to p4(d | a, b, c, u, l) above.
Under this assumption, the probability of Player 3 winning
by bidding c is
pc ca ;b;u;l j ðÞ ¼
X
d
p4 da ;b;c;u;l j ðÞ w3 a;b;c;d;u;l ðÞ :
So, Player 3 will bid according to the probabilities
p3 ca ;b;u;l j ðÞ ¼
p3 ca ;b;u;l j ðÞ
P
c0p3 c0 a;b;u;l j ðÞ
:
It is straightforward to derive strategic decision-making
for Players 1 and 2 using the same conceptual approach, but
as we noted, these derivations proved too hard for our
inference calculations.
Final inference
The different decision-model methods we consider make
different assumptions about whether each player makes
nonstrategic or strategic choices. Given these assumptions,
our goal is to make an inference about an underlying
“group” value based on the observed bids. We do this using
the joint posterior distribution over the upper- and lower-
bound parameters that represent people’s knowledge. This
is given by Bayes’s rule as
pu ;la ;b;c;d j ðÞ
/ pa ;b;c;d;u;l ðÞ pu ;l ðÞ
¼ pda ;b;c;u;l j ðÞ pca ;b;u;l j ðÞ pba ;u;l j ðÞ pau ;l j ðÞ pu ;l ðÞ :
We put a simple flat prior on p(u, l), and all of the other
likelihood terms are available from the decision-making
models—either nonstrategic or strategic—used by the
model for each player.
There are many potential ways that p(u, l | a, b, c, d)
could be used to estimate the final group price. We use a
simple but reasonable approach, first finding the mode (u*,
l*) | a, b, c, d, which gives the most likely values for the
bounds, and then using the midpoint of these bounds (u*+
l*)/2 as the group estimate.
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